The Taliban took over Afghanistan in two weeks, ending 20 years of fighting with western troops and the Afghan national army. Many factors, such as a problematic peace deal, a lack of political will among the former Kabul administration to fight the Taliban and rampant corruption contributed to the group’s rapid advance and the fall of Kabul – but notable among them was a successful modern media strategy.

Prior to 2001 the Taliban banned the use of the internet, dismantled state-run television stations, ordered citizens to stop watching TV altogether and banned music. But after they had been ousted by international forces, the group rapidly expanded its online presence, starting in 2003 with a new insurgency. They launched a new radio station called Voice of Sharia, which had its own website, Al Emarah. Despite numerous attempts to block and remove it, Al Emarah has remained the official website of the Taliban. The site primarily contains battlefield news and videos, as well as the Taliban’s official statements. In the aftermath of their defeat, the Taliban focused their efforts on reviving the group online, “a virtual emirate”, as one scholar called it.

The Taliban have produced online magazines in multiple languages (English, Pashto, Dari, Arabic, and so on) and tailored their messaging in each to appeal to its audience’s interests and concerns. For instance, religion is invoked in Arabic and English publications, appeals to nationalism are made in Persian text, and Urdu content deals with local political concerns. Internationally, the Taliban frame themselves as a “national” radical Islamist group that seeks social justice and self-determination while fighting imperialism. A common thread throughout is the legitimisation of the Taliban as a viable political alternative to the Kabul government; their military competence and strategic victories are played up in order to position the Taliban as a significant regional power.

Formulating messages to resonate with local populations is a tactic that the international coalition forces failed at, however. The Taliban have remained focused on building a sense of identity rooted in Afghan culture. It was this strategy that won them much support among some segments of the population, including local influential figures such as mullahs, religious scholars and community elders. Over the last couple of weeks these allies played an important role in convincing the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF) and Afghan officials to surrender to the Taliban – “the sons of the country” – rather than fight them.

Ironically the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure post-2001 has also proved a great boon to the Islamist group. Recent estimates indicate that 89% of Afghans now have internet access through their mobile phone, dramatically increasing the in-country reach of online Taliban propaganda and recruitment materials. In the backdrop of increased penetration of telecommunication technologies, the Taliban and their supporters have also made use of apps: end-to-end encrypted platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram are used to connect, organise operations, distribute reports and connect with foreign and local journalists. The Taliban has also used WhatsApp for providing services such as crime hotlines in areas under their control. The leadership, recruiters and activists have been active on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter for more than a decade now.

This new, more tech-savvy Taliban also followed the established formula of other violent jihadist groups, such as al-Qaida and Isis, establishing a public presence on social media platforms. These communities are valuable fundraising tools and crucial to recruitment outreach. Furthermore, their decentralised nature and lack of reliance on any fixed physical infrastructure made them difficult to shut down and control. There was no radio station to bomb, no signal to jam, no publicists to arrest. As the Taliban’s spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid said: “We are trying to make the most of modern facilities to suit our needs.”

The Taliban’s media strategy has been successful over the past two decades because of their ability to get out their message faster than their enemies. They managed to publish their side of the story much earlier than the Afghan government and international forces could process theirs through bureaucratic channels.

This proved particularly effective in shaping the narrative around the US troop withdrawal agreement. The US-Taliban agreement of February 2020 was sold as the Taliban’s victory and the beginning of the end of Ashraf Ghani’s government. In fact, the ANDSF’s reluctance to fight the Taliban has also been partially attributed to the impact of this psychological warfare and the resulting demoralisation of the Afghan security forces.

After the capture of Kabul, the Taliban launched a public relations campaign to project a different image of the group, distancing themselves from a legacy of brutal force and the violent oppression of women and ethnic minorities by circulating messages ensuring the safety and security of all Afghans. While the Taliban are still banned from Facebook and YouTube, they have recruited influential YouTubers with thousands of followers to report on life in Kabul under their rule, helping to cast the new regime in a positive light. Under the watchful gaze of mobile phones the Taliban try to behave, but once there are no eyes watching they beat, harass, insult and mistreat people on the streets.

Of course, the very technologies that accelerated the Taliban’s return to power could undermine the new regime: there are concerns that some social media might be banned precisely for these reasons, and it will not be the first country in the region to do so. Currently, various social media platforms are the primary means of resistance to the Taliban’s rule, and for many civilians the only means of raising their voice and opinions. If the Taliban manage to impose broad internet restrictions and control the information traffic going out of Afghanistan, this last window of hope will be closed to millions of people in the country.

• Weeda Mehran is a lecturer in politics at the University of Exeter